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Legitimate Regulation of Religion? European 
Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom 
Doctrine and the Russian Federation Law 
"On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations" 
Joseph Brossart* 
Can it be anything else but the logical, extreme expression of that Westernism 
which, since the time of Peter the Great, demoralized both our government and 
our society, and has already marred all the spiritual manifestations of our 
national life? Not content to Profit by all the riches of European thought and 
knowledge, we borrowed her spirit, developed by a foreign history and foreign 
religion. We began idolising Europe, worshiping her gods and her idols! 
-Ivan Aksakov, 18811 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 26, 1997, Boris Yeltsin signed the draft law "on Free-
dom of Conscience and Religious Associations" (the 1997 Law). The 
1997 Law has been criticized as violating the Russian Constitution and 
certain human rights conventions.2 While many facets of the 1997 Law 
have been attacked, the portion that has drawn the most criticism is 
article 27. Article 27 differentiates between religious organizations that 
meet the formal condition of "hav[ingJ documents that confirm their 
existence in the respective territory for at least fifteen years," and those 
that do not. 3 Those that qualify can register as "religious organiza-
* Law clerk to the Honorable Robert B. Krupansky, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit. My previous experience includes five years of work in the countries of the former 
Soviet Union. I would like to thank my wife, Anna, and my parents for their support. I would also 
like to thank Professors John Robinson and Dinah Shelton of Notre Dame Law School for 
reviewing prior versions of this article. 
1 Ivan Aksakov, A Slavophile Statement, in 2 READINGS IN RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION 378, 379 
(Thomas Riha ed., 1964). 
2 See, e.g., T.Jeremy Gunn, Caesar's Sword: The 1997 Law o/the Russian Federation on the Freedom 
o/Conscience and Religious Associations, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 43, 46 (1998). 
3 RF Law No. 125·F3, art. 27, § 3, reprinted in Religion Law Official (Paul Steves, trans.) (visited 
Mar. 17, 1999) <http://www.stetson.edu/ -psteeves/relnews> [hereinafter 1997 Law J. 
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tions," while those that do not are merely "religious associations."4 
While both enjoy the rights of legal personality, religious associations 
must re-register annually as opposed to simply informing authorities 
of their continued existence.5 Additionally, religious associations do 
not er~joy the benefit of the portions of the 1997 Law that allow 
religious organizations to create public educational institutions, to 
conduct religious rites in hospitals, orphanages, retirement homes and 
prisons, to manufacture, import or distribute religious literature, to 
manufacture religious objects, to establish mass-media organizations, 
to create institutions for professional religious education, or to own 
property.6 Besides the limitations on the religious associations them-
selves, members of religious associations do not enjoy the benefit of 
the portions of the 1997 Law that allow members of religious organi-
zations to qualify for alternative military service or teach religion to 
children with the permission of both parents.7 While the restrictions 
on religious associations are substantial, the only provisions that di-
rectly restrict individuals are those regarding conscientious objector 
status and education of children.8 The other provisions are limitations 
on group rights or group evangelism. This article will examine the 
provisions of the Constitution ofthe Russian Federation relevant to the 
1997 Law, describe the religious freedom doctrine of the European 
Court of Human Rights ("ECHR" or "European Court") and, finally, 
examine how the ECHR religious freedom case law might affect the 
1997 Law and defend the 1997 Law from attacks made on the basis of 
ECHR precedent. While the merits of the 1997 Law are certainly open 
to debate, it does not violate the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion under ECHR precedent. 
I. THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
While many have offered their opinions of the constitutionality of 
the 1997 Law, only the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 
has the power to invalidate it. 9 Compared to earlier drafts, the version 
of the 1997 Law that President Yeltsin and the Duma eventually ap-
4Id. art. 6. 
5 See id. art. 8, § 9. 
6 See id. art. 27, § 3. 
7 See id. 
s See 1997 Law, art. 27, § 3. 
9 The present Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted by referendum on December 
12, 1993, and the Federal Constitutional Law "on the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
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proved contained fewer restrictions on foreigners and dropped a re-
quirement for religious associations to register with the government. 1O 
Under the 1997 Law, for example, small private prayer groups are not 
subject to criminal liability for not registering. As passed, the 1997 Law 
only requires registration if a religious association intends to become 
a religious organization. II 
The text of the 1993 Russian Constitution provides considerable 
protection of religious freedom. Some of the more relevant provisions 
are: 
Article 14: 
l. The Russian Federation shall be a secular state. No relig-
ion shall be declared an official or compulsory religion. 
2. All religious associations shall be separate from the state 
and shall be equal before the law. 
Article 19: 
2. The state shall guarantee equal human and civil rights 
and freedoms without regard to ... attitude toward relig-
ion .... Any form of restriction of civil rights on the ba'sis of 
... religious affiliation shall be prohibited. 
Article 28: 
Each person shall be guaranteed freedom of conscience 
Federation" define the powers of the Constitutional Court. KONST. RF, arts. 125, 128, § 3 (1993), 
reprinted in CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Vladimir V. Belyakov & Walter J. 
Raymond eds., 1994); see also Federal Constitutional Law No. I-FKZ, "on the Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation," Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1993, No. 13, Item 1447, translated in 31 STATUTES 
& DECISIONS 8-56, 41-42 Ouly-Aug. 1995). The powers of the present Constitutional Court are 
weaker than those of its predecessor. See Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Tndl: Seelling a Role for 
Constitutional Law in Soviet Disunion, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 41, III (1994). Stripped of its power 
to review the validity of laws consistently applied in an unjust manner, the court now has the 
power to determine only whether a law or certain provisions of a law are incompatible ,,~th the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation. See Nikolai V. Vitruk, The Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation and Protection of the (Constitutional) Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of 
Citizens, in THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 284, 287 
(1996). Whether the 1997 Law would be found unconstitutional upon Constitutional Court review 
would depend upon the ability of the Russian government to establish the law as necessary for 
upholding "morality," "health" or "the rights and lawful interests of other persons." Id. The 
outcome will depend to some degree upon the willingness of the Constitutional Court to look to 
international human rights standards to interpret articles 2, 17 and 55 of the Russian Constitu-
tion. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
10 Compare the draft "1993 Amendment" in W. Cole Durham et aI., The Future of Religious Liberty 
in Russia: Report of the De Burght Conference on Pending Russian Legislation Restricting Religious 
Liberty, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1 (1994), with 1997 Law, art. 26. 
11 See 1997 Law, art. 26. 
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and freedom of religion, including the right to profess indi-
vidually or jointly with others any religion or to profess none, 
to freely choose, hold and propagate religious and other 
beliefs and to act in accordance with them. 
Article 29: 
1. Each person shall be guaranteed freedom of thought and 
speech. 
2. No propaganda or agitation inciting ... religious hatred 
and enmity shall be allowed. The propaganda of ... religious 
... supremacy shall be prohibited. 
Article 30: 
l. Each person shall have the right to association, including 
the right to establish trade unions to safeguard his/her inter-
ests. Freedom of activity of public associations shall be guar-
anteed. 12 
However, article 55, section 3 of the Russian Constitution contains a 
counter-balance to these provisions, which also appears in article 3, 
section 2 of the 1997 Law. Article 55, section 3 of the Russian Consti-
tution provides that: 
Human and civil rights and freedoms may be restricted by 
federal law only to the extent necessary for upholding the 
foundations of the constitutional system, morality or the 
health, rights and lawful interests of other persons or for 
ensuring the defense of the country and state security.13 
The Russian Constitution also has several provisions dictating how 
it will be interpreted, some of which incorporate international human 
rights standards. Article 17 provides: "l. Within the Russian Federation 
human and civil rights and freedoms shall be recognized and guaranteed 
under universally acknowledged principles and rules oj international law 
and in accordance with this Constitution."14 
Furthermore, article 2 of the Russian Constitution provides: "Hu-
man beings and human rights and freedoms shall be of the highest 
value. Recognition of, respect for, and protection of the human and 
civil rights and freedoms shall be the duty of the state.''i5 
12 KONST. RF, arts. 14, 19,28-30. 
13 [d. art. 55, § 3; see also 1997 Law, art. 3, § 2. Similar language also appears in the European 
Covenant. See Gunn, supra note 2, at 74. 
14 KONST. RF, art. 17, § 1 (emphasis added). 
15 [d. art. 2. 
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Finally, article 55 of the Russian Constitution provides: 
1. The enumeration in the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation of fundamental rights and freedoms shall not be 
interpreted as a denial or diminution of other generally rec-
ognized human and civil rights and freedoms. 
2. Laws abolishing or diminishing human and civil rights 
and freedoms shall not be issued in the Russian Federation.16 
301 
The Constitutional Court has yet to interpret the interplay of the 
provisions of the Russian Constitution which invoke international hu-
man rights standards and those which protect religious freedom. Jus-
tice Vitruk of the Russian Constitutional Court claims that "[iJn exam-
ining all sorts of cases the Constitutional Court bases its action on the 
provisions of international legal texts on human rights, so it is able, 
when judging cases on the basis of the Constitution, to respect the 
democratic norms and standards recognised by the world commu-
nity. "17 If the Russian Constitutional Court were to look to international 
standards in reviewing the 1 997 Law, the Court would likely look to 
the ECHR since the European Court is the international tribunal with 
the most developed case law in the area of freedom of conscience. 
II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM DOCTRINE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
European Court interpretations could also be relevant because after 
Russian Constitutional Court review, a possibility of review by the 
ECHR remains. Shortly after signing the 1997 Law, President Yeltsin 
submitted four Council of Europe documents, including the European 
Convention on Human Rights ("European Convention"), to the Duma 
for ratification. IS Ratification of the European Convention would sub-
mit Russia to the jurisdiction of the ECHR.I'l 
Joining the Council of Europe would not make a decision by the 
Russian Constitutional Court academic. The ECHR consistently affirms 
16Id. art. 55. 
I7Vitruk, supra note 9, at 291. 
18 Russia (posted September II, 1997) <http://www.rferl.org/1997/09/110997.html>. 
19 Any laws which the Russian Federation expressly reserves from the treaty in ratification would 
not be subject to the European Convention ratione temporis. See [European] Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,1950, art. 57, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 
(entered into force Sept. 3,1953) [hereinafter European Convention]; see also FRANCIS G.JACOBS 
& ROBIN C. A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19-21 (1996). 
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that it is for national authorities in the first instance, and in particular 
the national courts, to interpret and apply domestic law and the con-
stitutionality of domestic laws.20 To this is added a margin of apprecia-
tion that the ECHR affords to determinations of member states.21 Thus, 
while the jurisprudence of the ECHR should affect the decision of the 
Russian Constitutional Court by virtue of articles 2, 17 and 55 of the 
Russian Constitution,22 the determinations of the Russian Constitu-
tional Court should affect any particular decision regarding Russian 
legislation by the ECHR by virtue of the margin of appreciation doc-
trine. 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is protected by article 
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 9 provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion of belief and freedom, either alone or in commu-
nity with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and obser-
vance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.23 
The two major cases in the European system concerning restrictions 
on religious freedom most relevant to the 1997 Law are Kokkinakis v. 
GreeaJ24 and Manoussakis v. Greece. 25 Because of the limitation of article 
9, paragraph 2, the ECHR has not interpreted the right to freedom of 
religion broadly. Approximately forty-five cases claiming a violation of 
article 9 preceded Kokkinakis in the ECHR; Kokkinakis was the first to 
result in the finding of an article 9 violation.26 In Kokkinakis the ECHR 
20 See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19,"140 (1993) (citing Hadjianastassiou 
v. Greece, 252 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18, 'J[ 42 (1992)). Kokkinakis was recently affirmed by the 
ECHR in Larissis v. Greece-Euro. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 140/1996/759/958-60, " 38,41,44 
(Feb. 24, 1998). 
21 See Kokkinakis, 260 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21, 'J[ 47. 
22 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
23 European Convention, supra note 19, art. 9. 
24 260 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
25 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996). 
26 See T. Jeremy Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of Conscience under the European Convention on 
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found that Greek authorities unfairly applied a law restricting prosely-
tization, but declined to determine whether the law itself violated the 
European Convention. The relevant Greek law provided: 
l. Anyone engaging in proselytism shall be liable to impris-
onment and a fine .... 
2. By "proselytism" is meant, in particular, any direct or 
indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person 
of a different religious persuasion (eterodoxos) [sic], with the 
aim of undermining those beliefs, either by any kind of in-
ducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or 
material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking ad-
vantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or na-
ivety.27 
Between 1936 and 1993, Minos Kokkinakis, aJehovah's Witness, was 
arrested sixty times for proselytism.28 On March 2, 1986, Greek authori-
ties again arrested Mr. Kokkinakis, this time in the home of an ortho-
dox cantor, and later convicted him of violating the law against prose-
lytism for attempting to convert the cantor's wife. 29 
The European Court follow'ed a three-part inquiry to determine 
whether article 9 permitted Greece's limitations on proselytism. Ac-
cording to the ECHR, an interference with the exercise of the freedom 
to manifest religion or belief is contrary to article 9 unless it is "pre-
scribed by law," directed at a "legitimate aim"-the interests of public 
safety, protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others-and "necessary in a demo-
cratic society."3o The ECHR found that the conduct for which Mr. 
Kokkinakis was arrested was proscribed by law, and that the measure 
was in pursuit of a legitimate aim, namely, the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 31 In analyzing the legitimacy of the aim of the 
law, the ECHR noted that the limitation on the freedom to manifest 
religious belief in the second paragraph of article 9 recognizes the 
possible necessity of restricting religious freedom to reconcile the 
interests of various groups and to ensure that everyone's beliefs are 
Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, 305, 
310-1 I (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr., eds., 1996). 
27 KoMinahis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12-13, ~ 9. 
28 See id. at 8, ~ 6. 
29 See id. at 8, n 6, 7. 
30Id. at 18, ~ 36. 
31 See id. at 20, n 41, 44. 
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respected.32 The ECHR accepted that the sole aim of the Greek law 
was to protect the beliefs of others from activities that undermined 
their dignity and personality.33 
Necessity analysis, the third part of the article 9 inquiry, recognizes 
that "a certain margin of appreciation is to be left to the Contracting 
States in assessing the existence and extent of the necessity of an 
interference."34 However, the margin of appreciation is subject to re-
view by the European human rights system.35 In reviewing state action 
that comes within the margin of appreciation, the ECHR sees its task 
as determining whether the measures taken at the national level were 
'Justified in principle and proportionate. "36 To determine whether the 
measure is proportionate, the ECHR weighs the requirements of the 
protection of rights and liberties of others against the prohibited con-
duct. 37 
The ECHR recognized that the problem of proselytization might 
necessitate restrictions on religious freedom even in a democratic 
society. The ECHR characterized proselytism as "offering material or 
social advantages with a view to gaining new members for a Church 
or exerting improper pressure on people in distress or need. "38 The 
ECHR further called proselytism a "corruption "39 of evangelism that 
"is not compatible with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion of others."4o However, since Greece had not established 
any facts to support the conviction against Minos Kokkinakis, the 
ECHR found that Greece had failed to show that a pressing social need 
justified his conviction. With no pressing social need in the instant case, 
the conviction was not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, 
and thus was not "necessary in a democratic society."41 Still, and sig-
nificantly for analysis of the 1997 Law, the ECHR was prepared to 
recognize the legitimacy of the Greek law "if and in so far as [it was] 
32 See Kokkinakis, 260 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18, 'l[ 33. 
33 See id. at 18, 1: 34 
34 [d. at 21, '{ 47. 
35 See id. 
3(; [d. 
37 See Kokkinakis, 260 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21, 'l[ 47. 
38 [d. at 21, 'l[ 48. 
~j9 [d. 
40 [d. 
41 [d. at 21, 'l[ 49. 
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designed only to punish improper proselytism, "42 and allowed the law 
to stand.43 
Three years later, in Manoussakis v. Greece,44 the European Court 
found a violation of article 9 in a case involving the application of a 
Greek law restricting manifestation of religious belief. 45 The law in 
Manoussakis differed from the 1997 Law in that in practice it allowed 
more than formal conditions for evaluating religious organizations. 
The law involved in Manoussakis required religious associations that 
wanted to construct or operate a temple of worship to establish "essen-
tial reasons" for the construction or operation.46 The essential reasons 
requirement was fulfilled by submitting an application signed by at 
least fifty families, from more or less the same neighborhood and living 
in an area at a great distance from a temple of the same denomina-
tion.47 Manoussakis and the other applicants, who were Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, had rented a hall for religious meetings.48 On June 28, 1983, 
they applied to the Ministry of Education and Religious Mfairs for 
permission to use the room as a place ofworship.49 The Ministry asked 
them to have the signatures on the application certified, which the 
local authority refused to do.50 Mter numerous political interventions, 
they submitted a fresh application, and the local authority agreed to 
certifY their signatures. 51 In spite of this, the Ministry never reached a 
decision on the application.52 On March 3, 1986, the applicants were 
prosecuted for having established a place of worship without the pro-
per authorization.53 
As in Kokkinakis, the ECHR found the restrictions in this Greek law 
to be prescribed by law and to have a legitimate aim in protecting 
42 Kokldnakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21, 1 48. 
43 See id. at 21, l' 49, 25 (Pettiti, J., concurring in part). 
44 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996). 
45 See id. at 1365, 1 47 ("[T)he Court takes the view that the authorisation requirement under 
Law no. 1363/1938 and the decree of 20 May/2 June 1939 is consistent with Article 9 of the 
Convention (art. 9) only in so far as it is intended to allow the Minister to verify whether the 
formal conditions laid down in those enactments are satisfied." (emphasis added». 
46/d. at 1355, , 23. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 1351, , 7. 
49 See Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1351,1 12. 
50 See id. at 1351, 1 9. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. at 1351-52, 'I 11. 
53 See id. at 1352, , 12. 
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public order. 54 While the ECHR did not explain its rationale for finding 
the existence of a legitimate aim in protecting public order, the Greek 
government's assertion that the law supported public order rested on 
historical grounds. The government's assertion of its interest is so 
similar to one which the Russian Federation could plausibly offer as its 
rationale for the 1997 Law that it merits quotation here: 
In the first place, although the notion of public order had 
features that were common to the democratic societies in 
Europe, its substance varied on account of national charac-
teristics. In Greece virtually the entire population was of the 
Christian Orthodox faith, which was closely associated with 
important moments in the history of the Greek nation. The 
Orthodox Church had kept alive the national conscience and 
Greek patriotism during the periods of foreign occupation. 
Secondly, various sects sought to manifest their ideas and 
doctrines using all sorts of "unlawful and dishonest" means. 
The intervention of the State to regulate this area with a view 
to protecting those whose rights and freedoms were affected 
by the activities of socially dangerous sects was indispensable 
to maintain public order on Greek territory.55 
In its examination of whether the law was "necessary in a democratic 
society," the ECHR noted that the Greek law's requirement of a deter-
mination of whether there is a "real need" allowed far-reaching inter-
ference by the political, administrative and ecclesiastical authorities.56 
Prior to ECHR review, the European Commission in its determination 
also noted that "[t]he intervention of the Greek Orthodox Church in 
the procedure raised a complex question under paragraph 2 of article 
9."57 It appears that the ecclesiastical interference involved was far-
reaching, since both the prosecutor's office and the criminal court 
relied expressly on the lack of the bishop's authorization.58 
54 See Manaussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1362, ,. 40; see also Kollkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) at 20, " 41, 44. 
55 Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1362, 1 39. Some have argued that the ECHR 
rejected the idea of historical considerations providing a basis for religious restrictions having a 
legitimate aim in protecting pnblic order. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 2, at 67. This is hard to 
understand, given that the ECHR found the law in Manaussakis to have a legitimate aim. See 
supra notes 45, 54 and accompanying text. A decision recognizing the 1997 Law as having a 
legitimate aim would therefore be consistent with Manaussakis. See id. 
56 [d. at 1364, 1 45. 
57 [d. at 1364, 1 43. 
58 See id. at 1366, 1 51. 
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The ECHR made clear in its holding that it was the ability to exercise 
discretion, inviting governmental intrusion, that was determinative in 
the case.59 The ECHR asserted that "[t]he right to freedom of religion 
under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State 
to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express 
such beliefs are legitimate."6o That the governmental discretion was 
determinative is supported by the fact that the ECHR was willing to 
recognize the legitimacy of the Greek law "in so far as it is intended to 
allow the Minister to verify whether the formal conditions laid down in 
those enactments are satisfied."G] Although the ECHR found an article 
9 violation in Manoussakis, the case actually extends the ECHR's will-
ingness to recognize a regulation as legitimate from acceptance of a 
regulation "if and in so far as [it is] designed only to punish improper 
proselytism "62 to an acceptance of a broader range of regulations on 
religious practice if they require no qualitative judgments by the gov-
ernment. 
III. THE 1997 LAW UNDER THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
As shown by the acceptance by the ECHR in Manoussakis of secular 
criteria for differentiating between religious organizations,53 the ECHR 
accepts a statute's potential disparate impact among religious organi-
zations as permissible when such distinctions result from application 
of secular criteria, even when a statute is expressly aimed at religion.64 
Under the jurisprudence of the European Court, distinguishing 
among religions only provides a prima facie case for an article 9 chal-
lenge-one that can be defeated if the state shows the restriction was 
prescribed by law, had a legitimate aim, and falls within the margin of 
appreciation accorded member states for determining whether an act 
is necessary in a democratic society.65 Were the 1997 Law to come 
before the ECHR, it would stand every chance of being upheld. 
59 See id. at 1365. 11 47. 
60 Manoussakis. 23 Em. Ct. H.R. (Sel'. A) at 1365.11 47. 
61 [d. (emphasis added). 
62 Kohhinahis. 260 Em. Ct. H.R. (sel'. A) at 21. 'I 48. 
63 See Manoussahis. 23 Em. Ct. H.R. (sel'. A) at 1365. 'I 47. 
64 See id. 
65 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text. 
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A. Prescribed by Law 
The 1997 Law would certainly pass the first hurdle, the question of 
being prescribed by law, which has rarely been an issue in article 9 
cases. The prescribed by law doctrine is better-developed under article 
10 where it requires accessibility and foreseeability.66 Accessibility refers 
to the availability of the law in the sense of knowledge of it and its 
presentation in a comprehensible form, while foreseeability requires 
that there must be some general understanding of the situations cov-
ered by the law.67 As evidenced by its publication in major Russian 
newspapers68 and its bright line rules, the 1997 Law meets these re-
quirements. 
B. Legitimate Aim 
The second part of ECHR article 9 analysis requires the 1997 Law 
to have a legitimate aim in public safety, the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.69 Given that it contains only formal conditions like the fifteen-
year waiting period, the 1997 Law could be found to have a legitimate 
aim in protecting public order based upon two rationales. One is the 
special historical circumstance argument put forward by Greece in 
Manoussakis. 70 Another is religious restoration, an idea which the 
ECHR has not previously considered. 
1. Special Historical Circumstances 
Special historical circumstances have been noted as providing a legiti-
mate reason to allow an even wider margin of appreciation in future 
article 9 cases.71 Greece put forward the idea of special historical 
circumstances as a grounds for the legitimate aim of religious restric-
tions in Manoussakis, and the ECHR recognized the legitimate aim of 
the Greek law without comment.72 Just as Greece argued that restric-
66 See JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 19, at 224-28. 
67 See id. 
tiS See Ross. GAZETA, Oct. 1, 1997, available in Religion Law Official, supra note 3. 
69 See European Convention, supra note 19, art. 9. 
70 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
71 See Harold J. Berman, Religious Rights in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Transition: A 
Histarical Theory, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, 
supra note 26, at 304. 
72 See Manoussakis v. Greece, 23 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1362,1 40 (1996). 
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tions on proselytism had the legitimate aim of protecting a cultural 
resource which had helped save the country during foreign occupa-
tions and which was under attack from foreign religions, Russia like-
wise has a legitimate aim in protecting a resource which has been its 
strength in the past and can see it through its present-day crisis. 
There is little argument that Russia is living through special historic 
circumstances. Western journalists have documented the state of affairs 
in Russia today: 
As [the] fortunes [of the Orthodox Church] have prospered, 
so too have those of other religious organizations, many from 
abroad, which have flocked to Russia with proselytizing zeal 
to reap the souls of a beleaguered and confused population 
.... [The fall of Marxist ideology] left an ideological vacuum 
alongside economic collapse .... In these conditions people 
are at their most vulnerable .... 73 
The cultural value of traditional faiths to the Russian Federation is 
hard to overestimate. As a representative of the Moscow Patriarchate 
said in 1994: 
[W]henever there has been a spiritual crisis of this intensity, 
the people has [sic] turned to the Russian Church. That was 
true at the time of the Napoleonic Wars. It was true in the 
First World War. It was true even under Stalin in the Second 
World War. Now we are in a comparable crisis. Moreover, both 
the extreme nationalists on the right and the radical demo-
crats on the left can be reconciled on this point, namely, that 
to meet our spiritual crisis it is important that a strong role 
be played not only by the Russian Orthodox Church but 
also by other traditional Russian confessions, confessions that 
have been tested by repression for seventy-five years and that 
have forged a fraternal relationship with each other.74 
To develop an understanding of the historical moment in which the 
Russian Federation finds itself, a few of the better-known anecdotes 
describing the spiritual state of the Russian populace follow. 
73 Robin Lodge, Russians EmlJrace Mystical Heirs to Rasputin, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH,july 27, 1997, 
at 24. 
74 Berman, supra note 71, at 303. For examples of the Russian Orthodox Church acting as a 
cultural resource for Russia, see NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA, 169-71,526, 
588 (4th ed. 1984). 
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A prime example of the inability of Russians to discern between 
legitimate religions and hucksters is the popularity of spiritual hypno-
tists in Russia today. The first to have widespread appeal was Anatoly 
Kashpirovsky, who conducted televised weekly hypnotic seances in the 
late 1980s. At his height, Kashpirovsky drew an audience estimated up 
to 200 million people.75 Kashpirovsky mesmerized the country. For 
those for whom the weekly seances were not enough, he encouraged 
them to put a glass of water in front of the television to absorb his 
powers so as to be able to drink it later in the week. It is hard to 
appreciate how widespread and deep Kashpirovsky's appeal was; even 
Pravda, the official paper of the Communist party, published a half-
page article praising him.76 Eventually the government came to be 
concerned enough that it ordered his seances removed from television. 
Still, Kashpirovsky remained popular enough to be elected to the 
Duma in 1993.77 Yevgenia Dvitashvili, or Dzhuna, as she is popularly 
known, is the current version of Kashpirovsky. She is Russia's best-
known mystic today, appearing on televised seances.78 There are many 
others, however, who gather smaller followings. 79 
Cults have also sprung up in Russia. One is the "White Brother-
hood," a cult founded by Marina Tsvygun, who claimed to have a vision 
during an abortion revealing to her that she is "Maria Devi Khristos," 
the reincarnation of both the Virgin Mary and Christ.80 Her husband, 
Yuri Krivonogov, claims to be the reincarnation of both John the 
Baptist and John the Apostle.8! Her husband worked for both the Kiev 
Institute of Psychology and Physiology and the Kiev Institute of Cyber-
netics in Ukraine, which were said to be involved in developing drugs 
for psychological warfare.82 One of the cult's rites was to take a tablet 
which they referred to as "the water of the River Jordan. "83 The pill 
75 See David Remnick, The Hypnotic Tonic of Russia's Dr. Feelgood, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1989, 
at Cl. The population of the Soviet Union in 1984 was 273.8 million. See COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS Y.B. 1191 (Frank E. Bair ed., 1987). 
76 See Adrian Berry, Mysticism an "Ominous" Sign of the Salliet Times, DAILY TELEGRAPH,july 25, 
1991, at 8. 
77 See Lodge, supra note 73. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See generally Andrew Higgins, KiCIJ Waits far Day After The End, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 14, 1993, 
at 16. See also Matthew Campbell, Hold the Front Page-This Cauld Be Our Very Last Edition, 
SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, available in 1993 WL 1141925l. 
81 See Higgins, supra note 80. 
82 See Kiev Cult Leader Fed Followers a "Truth Drug, "DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12, 1993, at 14. 
83 [d. 
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ceremony was likely the cause of the zombie-like state of the followers 
who could be observed standing on street corners handing out litera-
ture, asking for donations and chanting their hypnotic mantra to 
themselves. The cult leaders predicted the end of the world was to be 
November 14, 1993. Interestingly, all followers who wished to avoid the 
final judgement were to commit suicide on November 11, 1993. The 
cult claimed to have 150,000 followers throughout the Soviet Union.84 
What might have been a mass suicide was averted by arresting the 
leaders of the cult, all of the followers who gathered with them to take 
over Kiev's oldest cathedral, as well as anyone who looked like a 
follower. 
Aum Shinrikyo, the cult behind the nerve gas attacks on the Tokyo 
subway, is another concern. AUln Shinrikyo has considerable support 
in Russia where the cult may have as many as 35,000 members.85 Prior 
to the 1997 Law, the Russian Federation had no legal means of con-
trolling the cult. Aum Shinrikyo even had a radio station in eastern 
Russia which it used for broadcasts into Japan.86 Other, better known, 
less threatening, but actively proselytizing cults have established them-
selves in Russia. The Jehovah's Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, the Church 
of Scientology, as well as the Unification Church of Sun Myung-Mun, 
have all made strong efforts to gather converts in Russia.87 When 
President Yeltsin vetoed the last draft version of the 1997 Law prior to 
the one he approved, foreign papers recognized the event as an "un-
expected boost to hard-line radical sects. "88 
Cults have been able to prosper in the Russian Federation because 
for seventy years militant atheism was the official religion of the Soviet 
Union, and the Communist Party was the established Church. It was 
an avowed task of the Soviet state, led by the Communist Party, to root 
out from the minds and hearts of the Soviet people all belief systems 
other than Marxism-Leninism.R9 The sudden end of Soviet tyranny 
created a vacuum which all kinds of things have rushed in to fill. 
Russia, instead oflearning to deal with pluralism overnight, needs time 
to heal. As a representative of the Moscow Patriarchate said, "Russia 
84 See Ukraine Seizes Chiefs of End-of World Cult, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1993, at A9. 
85 See R. Jeffery Smith, Japanese Cult Had Network of Front Companies, Investigators Say, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 1, 1995, at A8; see also Lodge, supra note 73, at 24. 
86 See Asahara Radio Message: "Ready for Death, "DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 23, 1995, at 1. 
87 See generally Oxana Antic, The Spread of Modern Cults in the USSR, in RELIGIOUS POLICY IN 
THE SOVIET UNION 252 (Sabrina Petra Ramet ed., 1993). 
88 Lodge, supra note 73. 
89 See Berman, supra note 71, at 289. 
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needs time to recover her health before they descend upon us. The 
Russian Orthodox Church is like a very sick person that is only begin-
ning to recover her health."90 
Demanding protection for the vulnerable, the Russian Orthodox 
Church has recognized that the choice for every individual to choose 
one's religion or ideology and to change one's choice "must not be 
imposed upon us from the outside, especially by exploiting the difficult 
economic situation of our people or through harsh pressures on hu-
man beings."91 "The state, whose task is to protect the freedom of its 
own citizens" should be "more scrupulous in its support of non-tradi-
tional religious groups, many of which act in direct violation of the law 
and create totalitarian structures which entirely paralyze the will of the 
people involved in them. "92 
2. Religious Restoration 
Besides the special historical circumstance argument, Russia may 
also be able to utilize a religious restoration argument in a potential 
defense of the 1997 Law. Much has been made of the value the ECHR 
places on pluralism in article 9 cases.93 However the ECHR has recog-
nized other features of democratic societies, such as the spirit of toler-
ance.94 Indeed, there are some other features which are unique to 
democratic societies emerging from communist regimes. Under ECHR 
jurisprudence Russia may have a legitimate interest in protecting pub-
lic order by restoring the indigenous religious culture destroyed during 
70 years of communist rule. A period of religious protectionism, like 
economic protection of a developing industry, should be allowed to 
restore Russia's religious-cultural mix, lest Westernism finish Commu-
nism's work. 
90 ld. at 303. 
91 Letter of Patriarch Alexi to members of the Russian Supreme Soviet (J uly 14, 1993) (quoted 
in Berman, supra note 71, at 298). 
921d. 
93 See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1993) (Pettiti, j., concurring in 
part); see also Gunn, supra note 2, at 67; Holly Cullen, The Emerging Scope of Freedom of Conscience, 
1997 EURO. L. REv. HRC 32, at 34. 
940tto-Preminger-Institute v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 (ser. A) at 34 (1995). The European 
Convention is not alone in recognizing other features of democratic societies. The American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man states in its Preamble that a principle aim of the 
signatories is the "creation of circumstances that will permit [manl to achieve spiritual ... 
progress." American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. III, O.A.S. Res. XXX, 
adopted by Ninth Int'l Conf. of Am. States, Bogota (1948). 
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A concrete illustration is the rebuilding of the Christ the Savior 
Cathedral in Moscow.95 While the use of state funds to build a cathedral 
would normally violate First Amendment Establishment doctrine in the 
United States, this might not be the case ifit was the government which 
dynamited the building in 1931 without making just compensation. 
The Russian Orthodox Church was not disestablished by constitutional 
process but by a cruel and arbitrary power determined to eradicate the 
church altogether.96 In 1914, the Russian Orthodox Church was the 
largest of all national churches in the world and the largest Christian 
church in the world after the Roman Catholic ChurchY7 By 1939 the 
Russian Orthodox Church was one of the weakest churches in Chris-
tendom.98 The repression finally eased in the late 1980s when from 
1985 to 1987 the Orthodox Church opened or reopened a total of 29 
parishes.99 In 1988, the church registered 809 new parishes. In the first 
nine months of 1989, the Orthodox Church registered 2,185 new 
parishes. IOU By 1993 the number of new and reopened parishes in the 
Moscow Patriarchate surpassed 7,000. 10] 
Simply returning church property and restoring buildings does not 
reestablish the status quo ante. To fulfill the need for priests, the 
number of theological schools grew from four to thirty-eight. 102 It will 
be some time before the church begins to recover the number of 
priests necessary to effectively minister to such a large flock and estab-
lish the philosophical and theological foundation necessary to resist 
the wide range of offerings available in a pluralistic society. As a letter 
from Orthodox clergy and laymen to Mikhail Gorbachev and Patriarch 
Pimen expressed in May 1987, "Immobilized, mute and timid for so 
many years, [the church] has to learn all over again how to walk and 
talk."103 
95 See Daniel Williams, Letterfrom Russia; Moscow Celebrates 850 Years With Soviet-Style Pageantry, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1997, at All. 
96 See Paul Valliere, Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 278, 304 (Irene Bloom et at. eds., 1996). 
97 See id. at 279. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 298. 
100 See id. 
101 See Valliere, supra note 96, at 298. 
102 See id. at 298. 
103Id. at 295. 
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3. Legitimacy of Historical Arguments 
As the American Anthropological Association stated in 1947 in its 
comment on the draft U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Man, State-
ment on Human Rights, "The Individual realizes his personality through 
his culture, hence respect for individual differences entails a respect 
for cultural rights. "104 Recognizing the same problem in the similar 
circumstances which confronted the newly-independent countries of 
the 1960's, the association noted that on first contact with European 
and American power, many nations were awed and partially convinced 
of the superior ways of the Europeans and Americans. By the time 
these peoples were freed from oppressive regimes they saw the limita-
tions of the American and European systems of rights, and discovered 
new values in old beliefs they had been led to question.105 Russia today 
is similar to the newly independent colonies of thirty years ago. 
The Western approach to rights is simply foreign to most Russians. 
Ivan Aksakov, for example, described the foundation of Western con-
stitutionalism as "[an] antagonism between the people and a power 
imposed by conquest .... It is a mere agreement; a compromise be-
tween two camps hostile to each other, mistrusting each other; a kind 
of treaty, surrounded with all sorts of conditions. "106 Aksakov's thoughts 
are still representative of nationalists in Russia today.107 In the end the 
issues of religion and policy facing Russia must be settled in a way that 
makes sense to the Russians themselves.IUB 
To understand the Russian perception of the 1997 Law, one must 
consider that the law actually manifests progress in the area of religious 
freedom in the tide of Russia's history. Aside from the 1990 Law "on 
104 American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights, reprinted in THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 116, 118 (1988). 
105 See id. 
106Valliere, supra note 96, at 282. 
107 Most Russian Orthodox thinkers, such as Khomiakov, Kireevsky, Dostoevsky, Leontiev, Fyo-
dorov and Solzhenitsyn, have held that a community based on sobornost'and lichnost: (''whole-
ness" and "personhood") is ethically superior to a community based on the social contract and 
individual rights. Sobornost' is the theological expression of an emphasis on community respon-
sibility for the individual. Sobornost'is "the Orthodox vision of salvation in Christ which comes 
about through incorporation into his sacramental community, the church, the 'body of Christ.'" 
Valliere, supra note 96, at 281. The Orthodox emphasis on community as an essential part of 
salvation does not exclude a recognition of personality. However, lichnost: the Orthodox recog-
nition of the individual, is more an expression of personalism than individualism. See id. at 
281-82. 
108 See id. at 303. 
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Religious Associations," the 1997 Law may be the most liberal Russia 
has ever known. 109 The Law "on Tolerance," which was in force from 
1905-1918, is the only other law which approaches a similar level. llo 
The 1905 Law was more liberal in some areas, and less liberal in 
others. III The 1905 Law was superceded by the first piece of Soviet 
legislation on religion, the decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars 
"on Separation of the Church from the State and the Schools from the 
Church" in January, 1918.112 This decree revoked the recognition of 
religious associations as legal entities. It also forbade the public teach-
ing or studying of religion. ll3 Put in perspective of the 400 years over 
which religious freedom has developed in the West, the developments 
in Russia in the last decade can only be viewed as progress. 
Indeed, the 1997 Law is actually no more regressive than the reality 
of religious freedom in Russia prior to its enactment. According to the 
U.S. State Department, about one-fourth of Russia's eighty-nine re-
gional governments had passed restrictive laws and decrees violating 
the 1990 Law "on Religious Associations" by limiting or restricting the 
activities of religious groups, or by requiring registration. l H Prior to 
passage of the 1997 Law, local governments were preventing religious 
gatherings. ll5 There were numerous instances in which local authori-
ties refused to register the passports of foreign missionaries. ll6 
An advantage of recognizing the legitimate aim of the 1997 Law as 
lying in restoration of public order is that under this theory it would 
not be justifiable indefinitely. The formal conditions of the law do 
impose unequal hardships on certain religions. An example is the 
requirement of ten members to register a group. The ten member 
requirement is reminiscent of the dvadsatka requirement of the 1929 
Soviet law "on Religious Associations. "117 In order for a group to be 
109 Law of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic "on Freedom of Worship" (Oct. 25, 1990), 
translated in 33 J. CHURCH & ST. 191, 191-201 (1991) and in RELIGION IN THE SOVIET REpUBLICS 
31 (Igor Troyanovsky, ed., 1991). 
110 "On the Establishment of the Principle of Religious Tolerance," Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov 
Rossiiskoi Imperii, 3d series, vol 25, no. 26126 (1905), arts. 1(4), II, IX. 
III See Berman, supra note 71, at 288. 
112Valliere, supra note 96, at 285. 
113 See id. 
114 See U.S. State Department, United States Policies in Support of IMigious Freedom: Focus on 
Christians (visited July 22, 1997) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/hmnanJights/970722Je-
ligJpt_ c hristiau.h tml > . 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
117 See Valliere, supra note 96, at 286. 
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allowed to use religious buildings or objects, all of which the govern-
ment had nationalized, the 1929 Law required religious associations of 
no fewer than twenty believers to register and take formal responsibility 
for the property. lIS The 1997 Law similarly requires a group of at least 
ten individuals to register a religious association.1I9 Like the dvadsatka, 
this group of ten does not correspond to the canonical institution of 
any church.120 
The fifteen-year waiting requirement on being recognized is also 
tilted in favor of hierarchical churches like the Orthodox Church or 
the Catholic Church. For religious groups which lack a hierarchical 
structure, where each mission is structurally independent, moved by 
the spirit, each new work would require fifteen years of waiting. The 
Pentecostals, who have been present throughout the Soviet Union in 
sufficient numbers for a sufficient period of time to satisfY the require-
ments of the 1997 Law, will never be as free to grow and expand as the 
hierarchical churches because of their lack of a hierarchical struc-
ture. 121 
It is unquestionable that the 1997 Law is both inequitable and 
debilitating for certain types of religious organizations. Thus, the 1997 
Law, if justifiable at all, is not justifiable indefinitely. If the historical 
moment creates the legitimate aim of the 1997 Law, it can only be 
allowed to stand as long and to the extent that the historical moment 
lasts. 
C. Necessity in a Democratic Society 
The ECHR also likely would find the 1997 Law to be necessary in a 
democratic society. In necessity analysis, the third part of the article 9 
inquiry, "[t]he Court's task is to determine whether the measures taken 
at national level were justified in principle and proportionate. "122 This 
standard has recently been expressed as "whether the reasons relied 
upon by the national authorities to justifY the measures interfering with 
the applicant's freedom ... are relevant and sufficient .... "123 Kokki-
liS See id. 
119 See 1997 Law, art. 8, § 3. 
120 See Valliere, supra note 96, at 286. 
121 In practice, umbrella "centralized religious organizations," which have the power to establish 
religious organizations, might be used to circumvent the restrictions. See 1997 Law, art. 8, § 6. 
Thus, the law will have the positive effect of fostering inter-denominational unity. 
122 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20, ,47 (1993). 
123Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1958,159 (1996). Wingrove was an article 
10 case. See id. The Wingrove court additionally stated: "[Al wider margin of appreciation is 
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nakis and Manoussakis show the willingness of the ECHR not only to 
recognize a law as proscribed by law and to have a legitimate aim, but 
also to recognize the proportionality of formal restrictions on article 9 
freedoms in necessity analysis. 
Necessity analysis also recognizes that "a margin of appreciation is 
to be left to Contracting States in assessing the existence and extent of 
the necessity of an interference. "124 Scholars believe that the margin of 
appreciation doctrine will continue to be an important feature of 
article 9 case law generally.l2O As Manoussakis demonstrates, a state's 
interference must be great to invoke action by the European Court in 
article 9 questions. While the Greek government lost in Manoussakis, 
the case presented few conceptual or political difficulties in compari-
son with issues such as proselytization.12G Since Manoussakis, the Euro-
pean Commission has continued to take a restrictive view of the con-
cept of manifestation of religion. 127 
Like the law involved in Manoussakis, the 1997 Law invokes only for-
mal criteria-a fifteen-year waiting period. 128 The law does not appear 
to allow ecclesiastical interference of the type the law in Manoussakis 
did. 129 While the implementing regulations may alter the situation, civil 
authorities appear to have no discretion in approving applications 
under the law. 130 The ECHR might consider the severity of whatever 
criminal sanctions are eventually attached to the 1997 Law as dispro-
portionate, but the ECHR did not consider this factor in Manous-
sakis. l3l Thus, the 1997 Law would likely fall within the realm of what 
the European Court has found to be necessary in a democratic soci-
ety.132 
Some scholars have criticized the cases establishing a wider margin 
of appreciation in religious freedom cases. 133 However, this viewpoint 
generally available to the Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation 
to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, 
religion. Moreover, as in the field of morals, and perhaps to an even greater degree, there is no 
uniform European conception of the requirements of 'the protection of the rights of others' in 
relation to attacks on their religious convictions." Id. at 1957-58, 'll 58 (emphasis added). 
124Id. at 21, 'll 53. 
12,> See, e.g., Cullen, supra note 93, at HRC 34-35. See also Berman, supra note 71, at 304 
126 See Cullen, supra note 93, at HRC 35. 
127 See id. 
12R See 1997 Law, art. 27, § 3. 
129 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
130 See 1997 Law, art. 12, § 1. 
131 See Cullen, supra note 93, at HRC 34. 
132 See supra notes 33-42, 55-61 and accompanying text. 
133 See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 2, at 96. 
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is rooted in a concept of rights which only protects individual liberties, 
a position which is a minority on the ECHR. Justice Pettiti argued in 
a partly concurring opinion in Kokkinakis that the Greek law facially 
contravened article 9 of the European Convention.134 Justice Pettiti 
claimed that the only limits on the right to expound personal beliefs 
are those limits dictated by the respect for the rights of others where 
there is an attempt to coerce the person into consenting or the use 
of manipulative techniques.135 While Justice Pettiti's argument seems 
based on an emphasis on individual rights, he calls for the ECHR to 
refer to Europe's Christian tradition for guidance in determining the 
permissible limits on proselytization. 136 According to Justice Pettiti: 
The forms of words used by the World Council of Churches, 
the Second Vatican Council, philosophers and sociologists 
when referring to coercion, abuse of one's rights which in-
fringes the rights of others and the manipulation of people 
by methods which lead to a violation of conscience, all make 
it possible to define any permissible limits of proselytism. 
They can provide the member states with positive material for 
giving effect to the Court's judgment in future and fully 
implementing the principle and standards of religious free-
dom under Article 9 of the European Convention. 137 
Scholars look for support of an individual rights concept of article 
9 in the words of the Kokkinakis decision which praised the value of 
pluralism. 138 This approach fails to recognize that the ECHR views both 
pluralism and freedom of religion as valuable for the whole of society. 
According to the ECHR: 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a "democratic society" within the meaning of 
the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the 
most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believ-
ers and of their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset 
for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The plural-
134 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1993) (Pettiti, J., concurring in part). 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137Id. at 28 (Pettiti, J., concurring in part). 
138 See Gunn, supra note 2, at 67. 
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ism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been 
dearly won over the cen turies, depends upon it. 139 
319 
The ECHR continued, "[F]reedom to manifest one's religion . in-
cludes in principle the right to try to convince one's neighbor, for 
example through 'teaching,' failing which, moreover, 'freedom to 
change [one's] religion or belief,' enshrined in article 9, would be 
likely to remain a dead letter. "140 Yet in Kokkinakis, the ECHR allowed 
the restrictions against proselytization to stand. Manoussakis also em-
phasized the "pluralism, tolerance and broad-mindedness without 
which there is no democratic society"141 while allowing Greece's relig-
ious registration law to stand. These decisions, as well as the decisions 
in Otto-Preminger-Institute v. Austria142 and Wingrove v. United King-
dom143 are reconcilable only upon recognizing that pluralism is not the 
ultimate end of democratic society under the European Convention. 
Even if pluralism exists to serve society, there will be circumstances 
where democratic societies may have needs more pressing than diver-
sity. The European Commission on Human Rights has also "inter-
preted the concept of manifestation of religion narrowly, most notably 
in Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, 144 where it asserted that article 9 does 
not protect each act which is motivated or influenced by a religion or 
belief."145 The Commission's approach demonstrates that the idea of 
freedom of conscience in the European Convention is not based pri-
marily on the interests of the individual. 146 "While the Court refers both 
to individual and social justifications for freedom of religion, the bal-
ance seems to be towards the social. The assertion that freedom of 
conscience is a foundation of European democratic societies and the 
high value placed on pluralism, which is a social rather than personal 
value, both support a social justification."147 Understanding that the 
value involved is a social one shows the compatibility of the recent 
criticized decisions of the ECHR with Kokkinakis and Manoussakis. 148 
139 Kokkinakis, 260 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, ~ 31 (Pettiti, j., concurring in part) (emphasis 
added). 
140Id. (emphasis added). 
141 Manoussakis v. Greece, 23 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1363, , 41 (1996). 
142 295 Em. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 47 (1994). 
143 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937 (ser. A) (1996). 
144App. No. 7050/75, 3 Em. H.R. Rep. 218 (Commission Report). 
14"Cullen, supra note 93, at 33, quoting Arrowsmith, App. No. 7050/75, 3 Em. H.R. Rep. 218. 
146 See id. 
147Id. at 34. 
148 For criticism of these decisions see GUIIII, sujJra note 2, at 69 n.91. 
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Even the words of the Second Vatican Council, to which Justice 
Pettiti refers,149 provide support for restricting religiously motivated 
action in the name of the religious freedom of a democratic society. 
Dignitatis Humanae, the declaration on religious liberty adopted at 
the Second Vatican Council, recognizes that "in spreading their relig-
ious belief and in introducing religious practices everybody must at 
all times avoid any action which seems to suggest coercion or dis-
honest or unworthy persuasion when dealing with the uneducated or 
poor. Such a manner of acting must be considered an abuse of one's 
own right and an infringement of the rights of others. "150 Restric-
tions for the purpose of the protection of public morality increase 
the ability of man to realize the basic good of religion by creating 
or maintaining an environment conducive to pursuit of the basic 
goOd. 151 
CONCLUSION 
The 1997 Law can be upheld under the principles which protect 
religious freedom in the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
express adoption of international human rights law into the Russian 
Constitution means that the 1997 Law could be upheld by the Russian 
Constitutional Court as well. That the 1997 Law might pass the restric-
tions of the Russian Constitution may strike people of other cultural 
backgrounds as patently violating the letter and the spirit of the Rus-
sian Constitution. Such a categorization ignores the fact that every 
legal tradition represents a synthesis of universal notions of rights with 
concrete historical conditions and commitments.152 Indeed, if the his-
torical experience of a people with respect to a matter is sufficiently im-
portant that it constitutes a foundation of the constitution itself, then 
it may even justifY departure from the ordinary meaning of the words 
of particular constitutional norms.153 To whatever degree the 1997 Law 
is not ajust law, it exposes a weakness in ECHRjurisprudence. Were 
149 See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (Pettiti, J., concurring in part). 
150 Declaration on Religious Liberty § 4 in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST 
CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 800, 803 (Austin Flannery, O.P., gen. ed., 1992). 
151 See George Van Massehove, SJ., The Graunds for Religiaus Freedom, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
AN END AND A BEGINNING 156 (John Courtney Murray, SJ., ed., 1966). 
152 See Valliere, supra note 96, at 303. 
153 See Berman, supra-note 71, at 300. 
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it to come under ECHR Review, it would challenge the court to articu-
late principles which explain why this law, in contrast to the laws 
considered in all previous article 9 cases, should be invalidated. 
